Horthy attempted to withdraw from the war – caught between two fires.
- v. Balázs Róbert
- Jul 2
- 5 min read
Horthy's Attempt to Break Out Led to His Son’s Abduction by the Gestapo
After the failure of the Wehrmacht's Heeresgruppe Mitte in late June 1944, the I. Hungarian Army immediately lost all of its German reserve units in its supply zones, as they had been deployed in the north to counter the advance of the Red Army. On July 23, the weakened I. Army was attacked by a local Soviet offensive on the left wing of the 1st Ukrainian Front.
The Hungarian defensive lines were breached at the foot of the Carpathians on the first day. Within less than a week, the Hungarian Army’s resistance collapsed, and the Hunyadi Line was broken at several points.
The surviving units retreated chaotically, with soldiers abandoning their weapons and fleeing.
Most of the tanks of the Second Armoured Division had to be abandoned due to a lack of fuel. In an effort to restore order, desertion and panic-mongering were marked by public hangings and sporadic executions under heavy fire.
Following the defeat, General Beregfy was replaced by General Red Army Commander Vörös, and temporarily, General Ferenc Farkas took command. Farkas' decisive action restored the situation by the end of July, halting the Hungarian Army’s retreat.
The troops were then sent to the so-called "millennium border," the wooded mountain range of Transcarpathia.
There, reorganised, the Hungarian Army put up fierce resistance, surprising the newly appointed commander of the 4th Ukrainian Front, General Ivan J. Petrov.
Soviet attacks in early August were repelled, preventing the Red Army from entering Hungary’s interior – at least, for the time being.
Realising the hopelessness of the situation, Horthy senior seriously considered leaving the war and requesting an armistice to avoid disaster. To this end, he removed the pro-German Prime Minister Sztójay and intended to appoint General Géza Lakatos as Prime Minister, though he hesitated to accept. The process was blocked by Hitler’s envoy in Budapest, Veesenmayer, who prohibited the new government from being formed.
Hitler threatened military intervention if these changes were to occur.
As a result, although Horthy felt deeply insulted in his dignity, he, under the counsel of his advisors, hesitated to resign. However, he rejected the idea of Wehrmacht officers taking up positions in the General Staff of the I. Hungarian Army, appointing instead Brigadier General Kálmán Kéri and replacing General Beregfy with General Béla Miklós on August 1.
Horthy forbade the deportation of Budapest’s Jewish population to the Third Reich and banned the Arrow Cross movement – all in defiance of Hitler’s clear opposition.
In accordance with Horthy’s secret plan, these steps were maintained until the military leadership was stabilised. With the army stabilised, Horthy initiated secret negotiations with the Allies – even with the feared Soviets – to secure acceptable terms for an armistice.
This was accelerated by the Romanian king’s coup in August, which led to the unexpected Romanian-Soviet armistice on August 23 (also with other Entente powers). Initially, Hitler focused on what he perceived as the backstabbing of his steadfast Romanian ally.
Horthy realised that this marked a major shift.
The Soviet forces could easily cross the southern Carpathians of Transylvania. Taking advantage of the German weaknesses, he forced Veesenmayer to accept the new government, resulting in Lakatos Géza becoming Prime Minister on August 29. As Foreign Minister, General Gusztáv Hennyey strongly supported the preparations for the armistice agreement.
The Romanian-Soviet-Hungarian relations rapidly shifted after August 25.
Romanian troops launched local attacks on border towns without a formal declaration of war, which only came on September 7.
During a six-day military operation, they captured Arad by September 13 but were forced to retreat within a week due to being outnumbered.
In the midst of the Transylvanian battles, on September 9, the Third Hungarian Army, including the IV. and VII. Corps and the 1st Armoured Division, launched an attack towards Arad. The Third Army was officially formed on September 19 under the command of Lieutenant General József Heszlényi. Although they took Arad on the 13th, they were forced to abandon it a week later due to a Soviet-Romanian counterattack.
The commander of the Second Army, General Lajos Veress – although from Transylvania himself – ordered a retreat on October 10 to prevent the destruction of Kolozsvár.
By September 24, Soviet forces had crossed the pre-war borders and, by early October, launched an attack across the Hungarian plains, targeting Budapest.
Marshal Malinovsky’s original plan to capture the capital in October was delayed by three and a half months, meaning Budapest was only reached later.
As the Soviet advance intensified, Horthy accelerated his efforts to withdraw. This was facilitated by István Náday’s flight to Italy on September 22 to initiate peace talks through British-Italian channels, but the British refused to attend. The Hungarian delegation, led by Gábor Faragho, then headed to Moscow, arriving on October 1.
The Soviets accepted the talks but, instead of the Finnish model, proposed terms similar to the Romanian ones: an immediate backstab against the German forces, territorial revision. The Soviet Union signed the Kyiv armistice on October 11.
However, Horthy did not order an immediate confrontation with the Germans. He attempted to negotiate politely and remained hopeful for a fair agreement.
This approach, however, proved naïve.
Meanwhile, the Germans had prepared Operation Panzerfaust to prevent the Hungarian reversal, in which both Beregfy and Szálasi could play a role.
Under the command of SS-Hauptsturmannführer Otto Skorzeny, the Gestapo kidnapped Horthy’s son at 8:30 a.m. An hour later, General Guderian issued an ultimatum declaring Hungary to be a battlefield, and only the German high command could issue orders.
Nevertheless, Horthy continued with his plans:
At 11:00 a.m., he announced on the radio that Hungary would leave the war and request an armistice from the Soviet Union – however, the Germans immediately launched Operation Panzerfaust. Though the radio transmitters were silenced, Horthy’s message was still broadcast.
However, chaos broke out in the Hungarian Army:
General Vörös ordered that the army not cease fire but wait for further instructions. Lakatos hesitated. Meanwhile, the Germans and the Arrow Cross quickly took control of the radio and other key points in Budapest.
"Operation Trojan Horse"
With the abduction of Horthy’s son and the Arrow Cross takeover, Horthy was gradually squeezed out of power, and on October 16, Szálasi was installed in power. On October 17 at 5 p.m., Horthy was interned by the Germans at the Hirschberg Castle, ending his active role, while his son was sent to the Dachau concentration camp.
Horthy's failure ended with just twelve hours of grace. This unsuccessful breakout attempt forced Hungary into a full-scale war for eight months.
Horthy did not want to fight in the war; he tried everything to keep Hungary out of it, but sadly failed. As a result, the Red Army treated the Hungarians as "fascist enemies," just like the Germans, and treated them accordingly.
(source: warhistory.org)
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